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Statutes of Limitations and Undiscovered
Malpractice
Stanley Sacks*
N OWHERE IS OPERATION of the law more harsh than in those
instances of absolute denial of any redress to innocent vic-
tims of undiscovered malpractice. In spite of the salutary legal
axiom boasting "a remedy for every wrong," statutes are yet
being judicially construed to limit legal action for damages to the
ordinary limitations period without regard to those circumstances
where the injured party, in the exercise of even the highest de-
gree of care, could not have discovered the commission of the
wrong until the limitation period has expired. Thus, in many
cases, injustice prevails where rights are denied to persons be-
fore they are even aware that they have such rights.'
A number of general legal problems have arisen out of mal-
practice actions and applicable statutes of limitations. Thus, the
fact that there is a choice as to which event starts limitations
running against the malpractice actions, either the physician's
wrongful act or omission, or when such act or omission resulted
in injury, is as naturally susceptible of varying judicial interpre-
tation as the myriad of other legal situations.
It is not surprising that there is a division of opinion in
whether the limitation period begins to run at the time of the
wrongful act or at the time the injury is sustained, where the
two events do not coincide. There is authority for the proposi-
tion that limitation statutes run, not from the date of the
physician's wrongful act or omission, but from the date of the
resulting damage.2 There are other cases supporting the rule
that the limitation period for malpractice actions commences at
the time of the defendant's wrongful act, rather than from the
date of the subsequent injury.2 On the other hand, a substantial
number of jurisdictions hold that there is no difference between
*Of the law firm of Sacks, Sacks & Kendall of Norfolk, Va.
1 "All too often in the past, in cases of inherently unknowable malpractice,
of which the foreign-object cases are a classic example, where the victim is
generally unlikely to learn of the harm before the remedy expires, justice
has been buried under an avalanche of cases applying the harsh general
rule that blameless ignorance of the injury does not prevent the bar from
operating." 28 NACCA L. J. 158 (1962).
2 United States v. Reid, 251 F. 2d 691 (5th Cir. 1958); Agnew v. Larson,
82 Cal. App. 2d 176, 185 P. 2d 851 (1947); Miami v. Brooks, 70 S. 2d 306
(Fla. 1954).
3 Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A. 2d 833, 835, 144 A. L. R. 211(1940) overruled by Foran v. Carangelo, 153 Conn. 356, 216 A. 2d 638 (1966);
Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N. E. 653 (1929); Bernath v. LeFever,
325 Penn. 43, 189 A. 342 (1937); Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S. W.
2d 140 (1934).
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the physician's wrongful act and the subsequent injury, as far
as time is concerned, and that the applicable statute of limita-
tions runs from the time of the physician's act.4 It appears that
statutes in medical malpractice cases appear to commence at
almost any stage of the case, depending on the jurisdiction. 5
However, the situation that too often fosters injustice and
thereby demands immediate and appropriate action, whether
legislative or judicial, is that predicament where the wrongful
act of a medical practitioner results in injury, but the injured
party is unable to discover in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence that he has been injured until the applicable limitation
period has expired.
Described as "statutes of repose, the object of which is to
prevent fraudulent and stale actions from springing up after a
great lapse of time," ' statutes of limitations are in many in-
stances being utilized as a means of actually defeating a meri-
torious claim by an innocent sufferer. Originally, such restric-
tive statutes were based on a policy of protection of a litigant
against the dangers of missing witnesses, errors in memory, and
recollecting pertinent facts. In that regard there can be little
contention that they do not serve a proper and worthwhile func-
tion in the law. They have become firmly embedded in our law
in the course of centuries. 7
Construction of modern day statutes of limitations in any
manner that deprives the innocent victim of malpractice of the
remedy he otherwise would have before he knows he has such
a right is a far cry from the basic ends that the statutes seek to
effect. Some jurisdictions have recognized the acrimony of ap-
plying the regular statutory limitation period in such cases and
4 Tessier v. United States, 269 F. 2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959); Hudson v. Moore,
239 Ala. 130, 194 S. 147 (1940); Steele v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480, 123 S. W. 2d
520, 120 A. L. R. 754 (1939); Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal. Rep. 2d 767, 270 P. 2d
1 (1954); Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill. App. 596, 49 N. E. 2d 795 (1943);
Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 138 N. E. 2d 891 (1956); Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa
145, 162 N. W. 217 (1917); Waddell v. Woods, 160 Kan. 481, 163 P. 2d 348
(1945); Carter v. Harlan Hospital Assoc., 265 Ky. 452, 97 S. W. 2d 9 (1936);
Maloney v. Brackett, 275 Mass. 479, 176 N. E. 604 (1931); Tortorello v. Rein-
feld, 6 N. J. 58, 77 A. 2d 240 (1950); Carrell v. Denton, 138 Tex. 145, 157
S. W. 2d 878 (1942); McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 P. 2d 797 (1935).
5 For a comprehensive table and collection of statutes of limitations in
medical profession liability instances categorizing the statutes in both tort
and contract stituations and with reference to the time the statutes com-
mence to run in the varying jurisdictions of the United States, see Stetler
& Moritz, Doctor and Patient and The Law, 390, 391 (4th ed. 1962).
0 Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P. 2d 224, 231
(1964), citing 53 C. J. S. 900 (1948).
7 England's Limitation Act of 1623 generally is regarded as marking the
beginning of the modern law of limitations on personal actions in the com-
mon law. It prohibited actions to recover land more than twenty years
after the accrual of the right and was the statute upon which our common
law of adverse possession was engrafted. See Developments in The Law-
Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177 (1950).
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have refused to do so. These jurisdictions have relaxed the usual
limitation rule and have declared some appropriate exception
in order to sustain a recovery in a meritorious case.s
In Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc.,9 the Court referred to
the use of these qualifications to the rule, in stating:
The application of statutes of limitations has been considered
by appellate courts in innumerable medical malpractice
cases. This has resulted in various exceptions to our qualifi-
cations of the rule that the period of limitation commences
to run from the date of the active malpractice rather than
from the date of its discovery. Some of these rules may be
stated as follows: (1) The statute does not commence to run
so long as the physician's treatment of the patient continues;
(2) the statute commences to run at the time of the com-
mission of the tort or at the time of the injury, these terms
sometimes being used interchangeably; (3) the statute com-
mences to run from the date of the patient's injury rather
than from the date of the commission of the tort; (4) the
statute does not commence to run until the termination of
the physician's treatment of the patient, except where the
patient, prior to such termination discovers, or by the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence, could have discovered his in-
juries; (5) the statute will not run so long as the physician
fraudulently conceals the cause of action, unless the patient
in the meantime discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable
care, should have discovered the injury but the cases differ
as to what constitutes a fraudulent concealment; and (6) the
period of limitation commences to run only from the time
the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have discovered, the wrong committed by the sur-
geon....
One rationale for delaying the commencement of limitations
has sometimes been described as "the continuous treatment"
doctrine and has been applied in several cases.10 Under "the
continuous treatment" doctrine while the physician-patient re-
lationship continues, it is recognized that the plaintiff is not
ordinarily put on notice of the negligent conduct of the physician
upon whose skill, judgment, and advice he continues to rely.
8 "The dubious rule, that limitations on a malpractice suit starts (sic) to
run from the occurrence of the malpractice and not from its discovery, has
properly inspired many courts to escape it by benign fictions or adroit
doctrinal devices, such as viewing the malpractice as continuing until the
end of the physician-patient relationship." 28 NACCA L. J. 159 (1962).
9 144 S. E. 2d 156, at 158 (W. Va. 1965).
10 Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N. Y. S. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Ham-
mer v. Rosen, 7 N. Y. 2d 376, 380, 198 N. Y. S. 2d 65, 67, 165 N. E. 2d 756,
757 (1960); Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N. Y. 2d 151, 237 N. Y. S. 2d
319, 187 N. E. 2d 777 (1962); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A. 2d
825 (1966); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N. E. 865 (1902).
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Therefore, under those circumstances some jurisdictions hold
that the statute does not start to run until treatment by the
physician for the particular disease or condition involved has
terminated, unless during the course of treatment the patient
learns or should have reasonably learned of the harm, in which
case the statute runs from the time of knowledge, actual or con-
structive. In Hundley v. Saint Francis Hospital," a surgeon
was charged with a battery in removing certain organs of the
plaintiff without consent, and was also charged with malpractice
in performing the operation in a negligent manner. A one year
limitations period was provided by statutes in both causes. After
the operation the defendant made untrue statements to the plain-
tiff to the effect that removal of the organs was required by
pathological conditions discovered during the operation. The
Court held that the statutory limitations period on the cause of
action for battery did not commence until the plaintiff's dis-
covery of the unnecessary removal of the organs, and that the
statutory period for the malpractice action based on negligence
did not commence before termination of the physician-patient
relationship, since the patient is not ordinarily put on notice of
the negligent conduct of a physician upon whom he continues to
rely.
The Court defined the rule in the following language:
The rule is clear, as to malpractice actions, that "while a
physician-patient relationship continues the plaintiff is not
ordinarily put on notice of the negligent conduct of the
physician upon whose skill, judgment and advice he con-
tinues to rely . . ." Thus, in the absence of actual discovery
of the negligence, the statute does not commence to run
during such a period, and this is true even though the con-
dition itself is known to the plaintiff, so long as its negligent
cause and its deleterious effect is not discovered ...
Some courts have grounded another exception on the prin-
ciple that where a practitioner leaves a foreign substance or some
other harmful substance in the patient's body and thereafter
continues to treat and care for the patient but fails to discover or
remove such harmful substance, there well might be negligence
on the part of the practitioner both in the original operation and
in the subsequent failure to remove the harmful substance. In
this situation determination of the commencement of the limita-
tion period against the particular malpractice action may depend
upon whether the action is predicated upon negligence by leav-
ing the substance in the body, or by failing to remove the sub-
stance, or both such phases of negligence.12
Many jurisdictions have indulged in a doctrine of avoidance
1 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 327 P. 2d 131, 80 A. L. R. 2d 360 (1958).
12 Annot., 80 A. L. R. 2d 368, 386.
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of the harshness of the limitation rule in such "inherently un-
knowable" injury cases by holding that fraudulent concealment
by the physician tolls any statute of limitations. Thus, where
the existence of a cause of action is fraudulently concealed by
false representations made by the defendant, commencement of
the statutes of limitations is postponed until the plaintiff dis-
covers, or by exercising reasonable diligence could have dis-
covered, that he has a cause of action.13
There are other courts which have not indulged in any such
exceptions but rather have met the issue more directly. The
result is a split of authority. Unfortunately, much of that au-
thority retains the inflexible rule that continues to harbor in-
justice. Recent cases, while indicating a definite trend toward a
fair rule, also vividly demonstrate the continuing divergent
treatment of the problem.
Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho'4 held that the patient's
cause of action for malpractice arising out of the fact that a
surgeon left a gauze sponge in the patient when performing an
operation in 1948 was not barred by the statute of limitations al-
though the suit was not brought until 1962. The presence of the
sponge was not discovered until an exploratory operation was
performed in 1961. In scrapping the old doctrine and adopting
the "discovery rule," the Idaho Court said:
In one context or another, it has been stated that statutes
of limitations are statutes of repose, the object of which is to
prevent fraudulent and stale action from springing up after
a great lapse of time. 53 C. J. S. Limitations of actions,
S. 1, (1948). These considerations are not present in a
foreign object case. First of all, the existence of a sponge, or
gauze, or pin in the body of a plaintiff negatives fraud. Sec-
ondly, we do not often encounter a plaintiff who is guilty of
"sitting on his rights." If one is unaware that he has any
rights, it cannot be said that he is "sitting" on them ...
In Morgan v. Grace Hospital Inc.,15 the plaintiff and her hus-
band brought an action for malpractice against the hospital and
others for injuries caused by a sponge left in the plaintiff's
abdomen during an operation but not learned of by the plain-
tiff until ten years later. The trial court sustained a plea of the
statute of limitations, but the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, expressly overruling its previous decisions to the con-
trary, reversed and remanded, holding:
It would be unwarranted to assert that the plaintiff in this
case has slept on her rights; that she is asserting a stale or
fraudulent demand; or that she has needlessly delayed the
13 34 Am. Jur. 187; Annot. supra note 12 at 401.
14 Supra, n. 6.
15 Supra, n. 9.
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institution of this action or displayed lack of diligence in
asserting her claim with reasonable promptness after it was
practicable for her to do so. Can it be said that any at-
torney would or could have advised her to sue within a
year after the hysterectomy was performed? Can anybody
reasonably assert that she was guilty of lack of diligence
when the evidence of the alleged wrong or tort committed
by the surgeon was effectively sealed and hidden from
view by the sutures which he applied? Must she be penalized
and denied a day in court and must the defendants and
their employees be rendered immune from any redress of
the wrong inflicted upon the plaintiff merely because ap-
parently the wrong or tort could be discovered only by
means of an x-ray or by a second incision in her abdomen?
Doubtless, it is fair and accurate to say that neither the
operating surgeon or anybody else knew of the presence of
the sponge in the plaintiff's abdomen until another physician
discovered it years later by means of an x-ray examination.
It simply places an undue strain upon common sense, reality,
logic and simple justice to say that a cause of action had
"accrued" to the plaintiff until the x-ray examination dis-
closed a foreign object within her abdomen until she had
reasonable basis for believing or reasonable means of ascer-
taining that the foreign object was within her abdomen as
a consequence of a negligent performance of the hysterec-
tomy.
We believe that the "discovery rule" as stated and applied in
cases cited above represents a distinct and marked trend in
recent decisions of appellate courts throughout the nation
and that it is in harmony with the rule announced by this
court in the decisions involving subterranean coal mining
operations. We are of the opinion that this rule should be
applied in this case. ...
The West Virginia Court has joined the ranks of those en-
lightened jurisdictions which have moved forward towards sup-
pressing this inequitable doctrine. Having the opportunity to do
so without damage to the time honored doctrine of stare decisis,
it boldly rose to the occasion like the Idaho Court. Obviously,
the Court felt, as did the venerable Dean Roscoe Pound, who
once wrote regarding such a situation, "Law must be stable, and
yet it cannot stand still." 16
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has also recognized and
joined the trend of those forward-looking tribunals which have
accepted and applied the equitable "discovery" principle. In
Waldman v. Rohrbaugh,17 the Court was confronted with a medi-
16 Pound, Interpretations of Legal History 1 (1923).
17 Supra, n. 10.
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cal malpractice action filed more than the statutory limitation
period of three years after the alleged negligence. The Court's
opinion expressly refers to the trend of other jurisdictions:
An increasing number of states are following the discovery
rule in various factual situations. California took this posi-
tion in 1936 where a foreign substance was negligently left
in a patient's body by a physician, in Huysman v. Kirsch, 6
Cal. (2d) 302, 57 P. (2d) 908, and the patient was ignorant
of the fact; in more recent cases this holding has been ex-
tended to other kinds of malpractice. Agnew v. Larson, 82
Cal. App. 176, 185 P. (2d) 851. The Supreme Court in a
silicosis case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
began the running of the statute with the discovery of the
injury in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 69 S. Ct. 1018,
93 L. Ed. 1282, and the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Cir-
cuit reached a similar result in a case of tuberculosis in
Reid v. United States, 224 F. (2d) 102, where there had
been a negligent failure to advise that the x-rays showed
the disease. See also Thomas v. Lobrano (La. Ct. App.),
76 So. (2d) 599; Kozan v. Comstock (5th Cir., applying
Louisiana law), 270 F. (2d) 839; Ayers v. Morgan (Pa.),
397 Pa. 282, 154 A. (2d) 788; City of Miami v. Brooks
(Fla.), 70 So. (2d) 306. New Jersey and West Virginia
have recently, in soul-searching opinions, reversed their
prior adherence to the general rule and applied the time of
discovery date. New Jersey did it in Fernandi v. Strully, 35
N. J. 434, 173 A. (2d) 277. ...
The concluding language of the opinion was an adoption of
the "discovery" principle henceforth to be applied in Maryland
in malpractice-limitation situations.
On the other hand, the Virginia Court, in the more recent
case of Hawks v. DeHart,18 rejected the opportunity directly pre-
sented and chose to remain with the ever decreasing minority
of jurisdictions clinging to the old rule. Hawks was an action for
medical malpractice allegedly caused by a doctor's negligence in
leaving a surgical needle in the plaintiff's neck in the course of
a goiter operation performed approximately seventeen years be-
fore the action was commenced. The Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia held that the statute of limitations commenced to run
when the wrong was assertedly done and not when the plaintiff
discovered the alleged damage "where there was no trick or
artifice on the part of the doctor to conceal facts that gave rise
to the action."
The Virginia Court was aware of and, in fact, referred to
Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc., but elected to reject the reason-
ing of the West Virginia Court and what would appear to be the
I8 206 Va. 810, 146 S. E. 2d 187, 189 (1966).
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more just view.19 The Virginia Court concluded its opinion with
a declaration that in absence of establishment of trick or artifice
on the part of the physician, the regular statutory limitation
period would apply, without being tolled. Consequently plaintiff
was denied a right of action even though she had not discovered
the malpractice until after the expiration of the statutory period,
and nothing in the record suggested that in the exercise of rea-
sonable care she would have been able to so discover it.
Fraudulent concealment by the physician of the injury or
of his negligence will toll, or interrupt, the period of limitation in
most states. The Virginia Court's holding, therefore, represented
no novel treatment of the problem in that respect. In fact, fifteen
states expressly provide by statute for such tolling in the case of
such concealment,20 and many others by established case law.
The Virginia Court's holding was a clear rejection of the view
of the West Virginia, Idaho and Maryland Courts which have
solved their problems of injustice presented by undiscoverable
malpractice.
The Illinois Court has apparently taken yet another position
in upholding the inflexible limitation rule but with reservations,
indicating with appropriate language the reluctance with which
it did so:
We are not pleased with this result. The statute barred the
plaintiff's claim before she knew she had been wronged.
The defendant's admitted negligence was not ascertainable
to her. She presumably was under anesthetic when it took
place and she certainly has not slept on her rights. It
would be more equitable if the commencement of the limita-
tion period were delayed until she discovered the reasons
for her illness, but the statute does not permit the construc-
tion necessary to obtain this equitable result. Relief must
come from the legislature and not from the Courts.
21
19 There are cases to the contrary, fixing the discovery of damage or other
events as the time when the limitation begins, e.g., Morgan v. Grace Hos-
pital, Inc., supra, n. 9; but as said by Louisell & Williams Medical Malprac-
tice, Sec. 13.06, at p. 369 (1960):
"By far the majority of the courts have held that in the absence of
special circumstances that are common to various types of cases, par-
ticularly the disability of the plaintiff or fraudulent concealment by the
defendant, the cause of action accrues and the statute commences to
run from the time of the wrongful act. Among the common situations
involving this issue are the foreign body cases, i.e., those where the
gauze, sponge or surgical instrument is left in the patient at the time
of the surgery. Most cases place the accrual of the case of action at
the closing of the incision, not at the discovery of the facts sometime
afterward. The statute usually is held to run from the wrongful act,
not the date the damage occurs...." See, Hawks v. DeHart, supra n.
18, at 814.
20 Stetler and Moritz, op. cit. supra n. 5, at 389.
21 Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital, 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N. E. 2d 633
(1964).
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At least the Illinois tribunal recognized the undesirability of
such continued rigid application of the rule, and its call for
legislative action appears to have reached the ears of at least
some lawmakers. In the 1966 Session of the Virginia General
Assembly such a bill was introduced, designed to attain by
statutory mandate what the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
had just previously rejected judicially. 22 In New York state a
bill, introduced in the Senate, and pending at the time of this
writing, would also solve such a situation by providing for com-
mencement of an action within six years after discovery of mal-
practice for injuries resulting from surgery or treatment to
plaintiff's person. 23 A similar bill has been introduced in the
latest session of the legislature of the State of Michigan which
would provide that the "claim accrues at the time the wrong
upon which the claim is based is discovered or reasonably
should be discovered." 24 In Oregon, such legislation was in-
troduced in both the 1963 and 1965 sessions. While the bill
passed the Oregon House in both years, it was put to rest on
each occasion in a committee of the Oregon State Senate. It is
anticipated that the bill will again be introduced at the 1967
session. 25 And in Illinois, a code section was added by the 1965
legislature especially providing that in such cases the period of
limitation does not commence until the victim knows or should
have known of the injury. 26
22 H. B. No. 706, introduced February 18, 1966. The bill, which died in Com-
mittee, provided:
"Section 8-30.1 In any cause or right arising from professional negli-
gence or malpractice, the period of time during which the person having
such right or cause has not discovered such negligence or malpractice
shall be excluded from the computation of time within which, by the
operation of any statute or rule of law, it may be necessary to com-
mence any proceeding to preserve or prevent the loss of any right or
remedy in connection therewith; provided such person has exercised
due care to discover such negligence or malpractice."
23 Introduced January 18, 1966. New York law provides a three year statute
of limitations in an action to annul a marriage for fraud, but the running
of the statute of limitations is postponed until discovery of the wrong.
CPLR 214 (7). The malpractice situation would appear to be entitled to a
similar legislative treatment.
24 S. B. 447 Introduced April 12, 1965. At this writing the bill has passed
the Senate but is yet in the House Judiciary Committee and not expected
to be reported out this year.
25 H. B. 1506 Introduced February 11, 1965, which provided:
"Section 1-An action to recover damages for injury to the person
caused by malpractice of a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or operator of
a hospital or sanitarium, shall be commenced within two years from the
date when the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reason-:
able care should have discovered; provided that such action shall be
commenced within four years from the date of the act or omission upon
which the action is based."
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1965) c. 83 Sec. 22.1 as added by H. B. 1096 (1965).
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The recent flurry of legislative activity on this point would
appear to be a clear indication that a much needed change is im-
minent in the United States. As indicated above, many jurisdic-
tions have accomplished by judicial fiat what other states now
are striving to attain through legislative changes. The sum total
of such movements on both fronts is an obvious awareness of
the inequity of the present law, the demand for improvement,
and the beginning of a universal solution.
Thus, "undiscoverable medical malpractice" situations which
have too long and too often been the legal backdrop for court-
approved injustice and deprivation for innocent victims, would
now appear to be on the wane. While some jurisdictions have
tended to blindly cling to the harshness of intransigent applica-
tion of limitations, fortunately many more courts are effecting
the needed change. Legislative action apparently has stepped in
to aid the judicial forces, and one would seem to be able to
predict a total victory in the foreseeable future for the hereto-
fore remediless plaintiff.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss1/8
